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LONDON AND WASHINGTON
Maintaining Naval Cooperation despite Strategic Differences  
during Operation EARNEST WILL
Richard A. Mobley
We share the Americans’ long term wish to uphold freedom of navigation 
in the Gulf, but we differ fundamentally from them in short and medium 
term aims and tactics.
JOINT MEMO FROM U.K. DEFENCE MINISTER AND  
FOREIGN SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER, JULY 1987
Richard A. Mobley has completed careers as a civilian 
military-intelligence analyst and a naval-intelligence 
officer. He served on the staff of Commander, Mid-
dle East Force during much of the period covered in 
this article. He has a master’s degree in history from 
Georgetown University.
Naval War College Review, Spring 2021, Vol. 74, No. 2
 The United Kingdom (U.K.) and the United States cooperated successfully to help end the Iran-Iraq War, but national-level differences over how to 
protect reflagged Kuwaiti tankers revealed surmountable fissures in coordinat-
ing operations between the two navies, judging from recently declassified docu-
ments.1 Mutually committed to a cease-fire, freedom of navigation, and a halt to 
attacks on commercial shipping, the two nations were poised to maintain their 
rich history of national-level policy coordination and naval cooperation when 
the American effort to escort reflagged Kuwaiti tankers—Operation EARNEST 
WILL—began in July 1987.2 Throughout the operation, Royal Navy (RN) units 
continued operations in the southern Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, passing 
exercises with USN ships, and joint meetings with USN staffs. However, London’s 
suspicions about the risks and viability of EARNEST WILL hindered Britain’s abil-
ity to fulfill all of Washington’s “asks,” despite a largely successful record of co-
operation. Perhaps anticipating notional U.S. accusations of free riding, London 
rightly argued privately and publicly that it already was doing its fair share for the 
protection of shipping in the Gulf and continued 
to insist on national sovereignty. The benefits of 
the relationship fully justified the friction encoun-
tered in attempting to coordinate naval strategies.
American leaders repeatedly thanked their U.K. 
counterparts for Britain’s diplomatic and naval 
support during the U.S. Navy’s effort to escort 
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reflagged Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf starting in 1987, but hundreds of 
recently declassified British records reveal London’s misgivings about the effort.3 
In particular, the sources provide background to London’s efforts to distance 
the Royal Navy from U.S. control in the Persian Gulf and additional evidence 
about the United Kingdom’s initial rebuff of American requests to send mine 
countermeasure (MCM) vessels (MCMVs) to the Persian Gulf in mid-1987.4 Un-
fortunately, some of these issues—notably, London’s initial reluctance to deploy 
MCMVs to the Gulf—also became public, and probably gave Tehran a heartening 
perception of disarray in the Western camp.5
The British archival documents illustrate the challenges of coalition warfare 
even under good circumstances. They also provide material for an early case 
study about these challenges in the Middle East, in this case coalition warfare 
with a close partner, one with whom the United States enjoyed excellent com-
munications at all levels of the chain of command, agreed on long-term strategic 
objectives and perceptions of the adversary, and shared a rich history of naval 
cooperation. This article relies primarily on the archival material, with some cor-
roboration from memoirs and published histories of the Iran-Iraq War.
The trove of evidence includes summaries of cabinet meetings and leader-
ship exchanges with senior U.S. officials, talking papers supporting such events, 
written correspondence between U.S. and British national leaders, and message 
traffic between London and its embassies involved in monitoring the Persian 
Gulf. Topically the documents address assessments of U.S. naval strategy and 
reliability, the costs (to Britain) of the operation, and preferable courses of action, 
as shared among British leaders, including Prime Minister Margaret H. Thatcher, 
Defence Minister George K. H. Younger, Foreign Secretary Sir R. E. Geoffrey 
Howe, and Chief of the Defence Staff Admiral Sir John D. E. Fieldhouse. They 
were informed by frequent sharing of information among working-level British 
embassy staffs and members of the U.S. National Security Council, Department 
of Defense, and State Department, as well as at higher levels.
CONTEXT FOR EARNEST WILL
EARNEST WILL was an American response to Kuwait’s request for maritime 
protection during the Iran-Iraq War, a conflict that by 1987 was stalemated. Iraq 
had expanded the war to the Gulf in 1984 to force Iran to accept a cease-fire and 
hinder Tehran’s ability to export oil, the latter country’s primary source of foreign 
exchange. Iran, unwilling to accept a cease-fire, reciprocated; generally, however, 
it responded to Iraqi ship attacks on a tit-for-tat basis while preferring to confine 
the war to land, where it enjoyed significant advantages.6
The two countries’ approaches to conducting ship attacks differed consid-
erably. The Iraqi air force typically attacked merchant ships that were in the 
Iranian-declared exclusion zone by launching Exocet antiship cruise missiles 
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(ASCMs) at suspected but not positively identified targets in or near the zone—
an imprecise targeting technique that contributed to Iraq’s inadvertent attack on 
USS Stark (FFG 31) in May 1987.7 (See “Key Events” sidebar for a chronology of 
events through mid-1987.)
In contrast, Iran often was more selective in choosing its victims, in an attempt 
to dissuade Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries from supporting Iraq, 
and to attempt to alter oil prices. In particular, Iran attacked ships associated in 
trade with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait because of those countries’ significant finan-
cial and logistical support to Iraq. Tehran typically would identify the target using 
maritime-patrol aircraft or its own warships, and the U.S. Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) (according to declassified CIA analytic products) assessed that 
Iranian intelligence could identify which ships transiting the Gulf were associated 
with the United States and that Iran’s navies could identify these ships for attack.8
Both sides occasionally laid mines (of different types) even before EARNEST 
WILL started, a practice that Tehran employed to blame Baghdad for the Iranian 
minelaying campaign. Iran and Iraq also deployed different variants of the HY-2 
ASCM, the so-called Silkworm, with Iraqi B-6D bombers using one version while 
Iranian shore batteries used another—a similarity that Iran, again, used to try to 
blame Iraq for missiles that Iranian forces fired.
These dynamics changed in 1987. Following Iran’s September 1986 boarding of 
a Soviet ship, the Soviet navy began escorting Soviet merchant ships in the Gulf.9 
To protect against an increasing number of ship attacks, Kuwait asked for Soviet 
and U.S. assistance in March 1987. The Soviets were prepared to reflag or lease 
all the tankers Kuwait required and provide for their protection—a move that 
spurred U.S. interest in reflagging Kuwaiti tankers.10 Kuwait ultimately chartered 
three Soviet tankers.11 A Soviet combatant—typically a minesweeper drawn from 
the USSR’s small Indian Ocean squadron—escorted each tanker. It was a relatively 
low-profile operation—at least compared with EARNEST WILL.12 Three Soviet 
minesweepers routinely operated in the Persian Gulf, while a cruiser and a frigate 
joined their parent squadron, which also included several support ships.13
The costs of not aiding Kuwait would have been high for the United States, ac-
cording to a State Department assessment published in July 1987. Had the United 
States refused to aid Kuwait, the Soviet Union would have seized the opportunity 
to increase further its presence and role in the Gulf, likely including gaining ac-
cess to area port facilities it would need to maintain any substantial protection 
commitment over the long run.14
Iran perceived Kuwait to be a near cobelligerent with Iraq, given the eco-
nomic aid Kuwait was providing and its willingness to allow its ports to be used 
as primary arms transshipment conduits to Iraq.15 Tehran viewed American 
assistance to Kuwait City as a step that would widen the war, tilt the balance 
toward Baghdad, and sharply increase the U.S. naval presence in the Gulf—all 
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Key Events in 1987 before U.K. Decision to Deploy MCMVs to 
Persian Gulf
25 March United Kingdom is aware of U.S. decision to reflaga
17 May Iraqi air force inadvertently attacks USS Stark
4 June President Reagan requests enhanced U.K. naval cooperationb
8–10 June Seven Power Economic Summit takes place in Venicec
9 June Britain holds bilateral meeting with U.S. Secretary of State 
Shultzd
17 July Prime Minister Thatcher meets with President Reagane
20 July UN passes UNSCR 598 in attempt to end Iran-Iraq War
24 July Bridgeton strikes mine
25 July Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff requests that United  
Kingdom prestage MCMVsf
27 July Senior British cabinet officials formally oppose deployment of 
MCMVs to Gulfg
30 July U.S. ambassador delivers request for U.K. minesweeping  
assistanceh
30 July Prime minister agrees that Britain should not send minesweep-
ers to Gulf i
31 July Secretary of Defense Weinberger also requests that Britain stage 
MCMVsj
31 July Assistant Secretary of State Murphy discusses MCM support with 
U.K. ambassadork
3 August National Security Advisor Carlucci meets with U.K. leadershipl
 a. Private secretary (FCO), “Protection of Shipping in the Gulf.”
 b. FCO, “Venice Economic Summit: 8–10 June 1987”; private secretary (FCO) to private 
secretary (prime minister), memorandum, “Venice Summit: Shipping in the Gulf,” 
8 June 1987, Ministry of Defence: Private Office: Registered Files, box FCO 8/6816, 
UKNA.
 c. FCO Research Department, “Iran Annual Review, 1987.”
 d. FCO MED, “Venice Economic Summit: Secretary of State’s Bilateral with Mr. Shultz.”
 e. Private secretary to Galsworthy, “Prime Minister’s Visit to Washington: Meeting with 
President Reagan.”
 f. FCO to U.K. embassy Washington, “Shipping in the Gulf: Possible US Approach 
on Minesweepers”; defence minister and foreign minister, “Shipping in the Gulf”; 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to Chief of Defence Staff, message, 25 July 1987.
 g. Private secretary (MOD) to principal staff officer (Chief of Defence Staff), memoran-
dum, “The Gulf: Minesweeping,” 29 July 1987, Defence Ministry: Private Office: 
Registered Files, box DEFE 13/2390, UKNA.
 h. Private secretary (FCO) to private secretary (prime minister), “Shipping in the Gulf: 
US Request for Minesweeping Assistance.”
 i. Private secretary (prime minister) to Lyn Parker (FCO), memorandum, “The Gulf,” 11 
August 1987, Defence Ministry: Private Office: Registered Files, box 13/2390, UKNA; 
Moseley, “Minesweeper Request Rejected”; DeYoung, “Britain Rejects U.S. Plea.”
 j. Ambassador Price letter. 
 k. U.K. embassy Washington to FCO, “Shipping in the Gulf: US Approach on  
Minesweepers.”
 l. FCO, “Call by Mr. Carlucci.”
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developments it was determined to avoid. Its attitudes toward Moscow were 
more tolerant—probably a reflection of Soviet efforts to improve diplomatic 
relations with Tehran and an Iranian desire to avoid confronting two super-
powers simultaneously.
Perceiving such threats to Kuwait City, London urged diplomatic steps to help 
the United Kingdom lower the Royal Navy’s profile in the Gulf.16 Nevertheless, 
the Reagan administration was willing to protect the tankers, probably as an out-
growth of the Cold War and owing to a commitment to freedom of navigation and 
a desire to buttress its credentials with American allies in the GCC after the Iran-
Contra affair in 1986 revealed that Washington had provided weapons to Tehran.17
After bitter congressional debate, EARNEST WILL started with a bang in July 
1987 when Bridgeton, a reflagged Kuwaiti tanker, struck a mine near Farsi Island 
in the northern Persian Gulf while proceeding in the first EARNEST WILL con-
voy. Rather than constituting a single dramatic event, however, the escort regime 
evolved into a series of incidents, some occurring without warning, and intermit-
tent American and British responses.
EXTENSIVE NATIONAL AND NAVAL COOPERATION  
IN THE GULF . . .
The United Kingdom and the United States worked closely at the national 
level while maintaining extensive naval ties in the Gulf. They pursued an 
overarching diplomatic strategy to help end the Iran-Iraq War and persuade 
the belligerents to halt attacks against neutral shipping, at least temporarily.18 
Before and during EARNEST WILL both maintained combatants in theater to 
protect national shipping, shared operational intelligence, and worked on 
naval interoperability.
London and Washington perceived that ship attacks that had been oc-
curring in the Gulf since 1984 were an outgrowth of the Iran-Iraq War and 
pursued separate but coordinated measures to stop the war writ large and 
attacks against commercial shipping in particular. The two nations worked 
in concert to persuade the other members of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) to endorse unanimously a resolution—UNSCR 598—that 
called for a cease-fire to end the war. The council passed the resolution in July 
1987, a decision that Baghdad welcomed and Tehran, surprisingly, did not 
reject. UNSCR 598 called for Iran and Iraq to observe an immediate cease-
fire and withdraw all forces to internationally recognized borders; requested 
that the secretary general explore the question of charging an impartial body 
to inquire into responsibility for the conflict; and prescribed that the UNSC 
would meet again as necessary to consider further steps to ensure compliance 
with the resolution.19
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Iran, however, consistently rebuffed attempts to end the war and refused to 
accept a cease-fire. Given its unwillingness to comply with UNSCR 598, Wash-
ington and London pursued a second resolution that might impose sanctions 
against Tehran for refusing to comply; but while doing so they needed to appear 
to be neutral actors, to persuade the widest audience to support the problematic 
follow-on resolution.
Both Britain and the United States worked successfully to achieve temporary 
halts in ship attacks against merchant ships. London and Washington also agreed 
that the “Tanker War” might be paused if Baghdad could be persuaded to stop 
maritime attacks against Iranian interests. They judged that Iran’s approach to 
the Tanker War operations was generally retaliatory; Tehran’s ship attacks tended 
to follow Iraqi maritime air strikes. Both the United Kingdom and the United 
States judged that Iran might halt its ship attacks if Iraq did so.20 The Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) in November 1987 reminded its posts of the need 
to maintain pressure on Iraq to stop air attacks, “which fuel the tanker war and 
obscure the issue of compliance.”21
Consequently, Washington and London repeatedly agreed to pressure Bagh-
dad directly or via its GCC allies to halt ship attacks in the hope that Tehran 
would do likewise.22 In fact, the cabinet concluded on 23 July 1987 that the most 
important requirement in the immediate future was to end the ship attacks. The 
record of that meeting states as follows: “The government was doing everything 
possible to mobilize pressure for this on Iraq and Iran. There was hope that the 
message might have some effect.”23 Iraq reluctantly agreed to halt ship attacks; 
there was a hiatus in the Tanker War for much of August 1987. Then Baghdad 
resumed air strikes against tankers and oil installations on 29 August, and Tehran 
resumed ship attacks two days later.24
The Royal Navy and U.S. Navy both operated in the Gulf to protect national 
shipping and cooperated in the operational and logistics spheres, although the 
United Kingdom, to maintain its image as a neutral player in the Gulf, preferred 
not to publicize some of this activity.
• Logistics: U.K. tankers supplied fuel to U.S. units in the Gulf of Oman, 
according to a Ministry of Defence (MOD) memo written in May 1987.25 
Prime Minister Thatcher instructed senior British officials in July 1987 to 
remind the Americans of the help the United Kingdom already was provid-
ing them through Diego Garcia, its base in the Indian Ocean.26 At U.S. re-
quest, London in July 1987 allowed Washington to use Diego Garcia to move 
American minesweeping helicopters into the region.27
• Armilla patrol: London established the Armilla patrol in 1980, using two 
combatants to protect U.K.-flag and -registered ships transiting the Strait of 
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Hormuz and portions of the Persian Gulf extending as far as Bahrain.28 Brit-
ish officials wrote that the patrol, with its deliberately low profile, had been 
broadly successful in protecting British shipping.29 Proud of the Armilla pa-
trol’s record, they wrote in June 1987 that the United Kingdom “protects far 
more ships and has a far greater proportion of its resources in the Gulf than 
the U.S.”30—an assertion that the U.S. State Department seconded. Britain 
announced then that the patrol had escorted a hundred British vessels in the 
area over the previous year.31
• Expanded RN presence: Britain added a third combatant to its Armilla 
patrol in spring 1987 to enable more-frequent patrols in the Persian Gulf and 
to allow RN units to be near most British merchant ships passing through 
the Strait of Hormuz.32 After initially turning down Washington’s request, 
London also committed four Hunt-class MCMVs and a support vessel to the 
Gulf in August 1987.
• Joint operations: An MOD memo issued in May 1987 stated that the United 
Kingdom had agreed to exchange information on threat assessments, daily 
shipping movements, and force dispositions with local USN forces. The min-
istry also endorsed briefings with U.S. Middle East Force ships. Although 
praising the value of exercises with U.S. carrier strike groups outside the Gulf 
to enhance British antiair warfare capability, it discouraged RN exercises 
with USN units inside the Gulf as of May 1987—to avoid giving the impres-
sion of being “in bed with” the Americans.33
• Command, control, and communications: USN and RN ships regularly 
established secure voice communications with each other. The United States 
also provided assistance to Britain in accessing the Airborne Warning and 
Control System (i.e., AWACS) downlink in the Gulf.34 
Given this background of a long-term naval presence and existing cooperation 
with the United States, London was sensitive to potential insinuations of free rid-
ing and pressures from Washington for it to contribute more to a naval coalition 
to execute EARNEST WILL. In talking points prepared for the foreign minister in 
June 1987, his subordinates wrote that congressional pressure following Iraq’s 
accidental attack on USS Stark in May 1987 had led to American pressure on 
allies for more burden sharing, “preferably in a U.S.-led integrated naval force.” 
Although London was attempting to help the U.S. government get through its 
temporary period of pressure, the drafters wrote that “we are already playing our 
full part,” given the Armilla patrol’s activities.35
The FCO offered similar arguments to its embassies that month: “[Y]ou can 
confirm that we appreciate the pressures on the American administration at pres-
ent but believe we are already playing our full part in the protection of shipping.” 
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The FCO wrote that it had provided to the United States—notably, Secretary of 
Defense Caspar W. Weinberger—a statement on the Armilla patrol to give the ad-
ministration ammunition with which to “overcome the American public’s almost 
total ignorance of what we are doing in the Gulf.”36
The foreign secretary and defence minister in July 1987 jointly reflected 
similar concerns about possible blowback from a British refusal to deploy mine-
sweepers in response to a hypothetical U.S. request. Acknowledging the U.S. 
Navy’s limited MCM capability, they wrote that the United States was turning to 
NATO and other friends for help in the Gulf, and suggested that “refusal could 
fuel U.S. criticism that the Europeans are unwilling to pull their own weight.”37 
However, they also judged that there were strong counterarguments, which are 
addressed in the next section.
. . . DESPITE RESERVATIONS ABOUT SENDING MCMVS TO  
THE GULF
Despite Britain’s close naval cooperation with the U.S. Navy, however, its foreign 
and military policy throughout EARNEST WILL consistently also called for its 
warships to fall under national control, stay neutral, and pursue a de-escalatory 
policy in the Gulf while enabling a diplomatic solution to the war and protecting 
U.K.-flag shipping. For example, a draft negative response to a request from Chief 
of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral William J. Crowe Jr. for the United King-
dom to deploy MCMVs to the Gulf stated that the “long term policy of keeping 
U.K. and U.S. policies in the Middle East separate[—]and both our governments 
have reaffirmed this separateness[—]is in our mutual regional interest.”38
These broad objectives of British policy would prove problematic for the 
United States, which was interested in creating a joint naval command structure 
in the Gulf; sought additional, visible international support for EARNEST WILL; 
and had a lower threshold for engaging in contingency operations against Iran 
than did the United Kingdom. Several contentious issues arose from these differ-
ent tactical approaches:
• Risks of escalation resulting from unpredictable Iranian challenges and po-
tential preemptive or disproportionate U.S. responses
• How to maintain neutrality—a status both countries claimed regarding the 
war
• Size, number, type, and potential operational areas (OPAREAs) of ships the 
Royal Navy might send to the Gulf
• Frequency of and publicity accorded to joint training with the U.S. Navy in 
the Persian Gulf
• Naval command-and-control relationships in the Gulf
8
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• Zones of responsibility
• U.K. responses to U.S. rules of engagement to facilitate a policy of “distress 
assistance” in 1988
Although subject to increasing U.S. pressure after the Stark and Bridgeton in-
cidents, the United Kingdom’s national leadership initially refused to send more 
ships to the Gulf. Ultimately it would be actions by Tehran—not pressure from 
Washington—that provided the catalyst for Thatcher to commit British MCMVs 
to the Persian Gulf in mid-August 1987.
Before that happened, changes in U.S. national-security policy and the war it-
self forced London to review repeatedly key elements of Britain’s Gulf naval strat-
egy between March and July 1987. Even in early 1987, London understood that 
Washington was considering a reflag venture with Kuwait City and was interested 
in forming a joint naval command in the Persian Gulf to protect shipping more 
efficiently.39 Through that spring and early summer, American requests—albeit 
remaining informal—became more focused and urgent, particularly after rising 
tensions in the region made the issue of allies and burden sharing more salient 
in U.S. domestic debates over EARNEST WILL. American requests—perceived or 
delivered in 1987—included the following:
• The foreign minister’s private secretary wrote on 25 March that the United 
States would want Britain and other countries to participate in joint naval 
operations in the Gulf as an outgrowth of the reflag effort. He summarized, 
“[T]hey remain keen on multilateral naval activity in almost any combination 
of participants.”40
• The British ambassador in Washington reported on 29 May that the U.S. Na-
tional Security Planning Group had confirmed recommendations for action 
regarding EARNEST WILL. Although Washington was not then asking London 
to increase the U.K. naval presence, it sought London’s help in persuading 
other countries to make at least token contributions.41
• According to an FCO briefing, President Reagan wrote to Prime Minis-
ter Thatcher in early June to see whether the United Kingdom would find 
occasions to affirm publicly the importance of the region and highlight 
publicly what it was doing to further Western interests there. He also asked 
Britain to undertake “visible naval exercises with our ships”42—a request 
that the FCO interpreted as a proposal to increase the number of passing 
exercises in the Gulf and publicity accorded to them.43 A message from the 
FCO to its posts on 8 June called for a guarded response, telling them that it 
had advised U.S. officials that the United Kingdom would consider issuing 
“further statements as requested and, perhaps, slightly enhanced passing 
exercises in the Gulf.”44
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• CNO Admiral Crowe wrote to ask the U.K. chief of defence staff on 25 July—
the day after the Bridgeton mine strike—whether Britain would consider 
moving MCMVs closer to the Persian Gulf to reduce potential response 
time.45
• U.S. ambassador Charles H. Price II on 30 July met with the foreign secretary 
to request RN minesweeping in the Gulf.46
• Secretary of Defense Weinberger wrote to his U.K. counterpart on 31 July to 
request that Britain preposition mine-clearing assets in or near the Gulf.47
• On 31 July, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs Richard Murphy and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs Richard Armitage noted U.K. reluctance to deploy MCMVs in 
their discussions with the British ambassador in Washington. Armitage said 
that the Pentagon would want to have further discussions about how to achieve 
de-escalation in the Gulf without leaving Russia in a dominant position.48
• Frank C. Carlucci III, the assistant to the president for national security af-
fairs (i.e., national security advisor), met with several senior U.K. officials, 
including the prime minister, on 3 August.49 Acknowledging that London was 
reluctant to send additional ships to the Gulf, he told the cabinet secretary, 
Sir Robert T. Armstrong, that Washington was anxious for a tangible mani-
festation of U.S./U.K. collaboration in the Gulf and asked him for suggestions 
about how that might be achieved.50 
London thoroughly debated these requests during the spring and identified 
potential ways to help Reagan through his administration’s “domestic political 
difficulty” (in the words of an FCO overview) without compromising Britain’s 
independent national-security strategy.51 Just before the United States began 
lobbying for international support for freedom of navigation in the Gulf in June 
1987, the FCO notified its posts that “ministers are travelling to Venice in a mood 
to help the Americans over a period of increased congressional and public scru-
tiny of their protection of shipping in the Gulf.”52 The FCO wrote then that the 
United Kingdom was “willing to help the United States while not compromising 
our basic posture of not provoking the Iranians, compromising our impartiality 
in the conflict, or being sucked into an unpredictable conflict through integrated 
operations.”53 In talking points prepared for a bilateral meeting with Secretary of 
State George P. Shultz in the same conference, the FCO wrote that the “U.K. will 
do what we can to help weather Congressional scrutiny in the aftermath of ap-
palling USS Stark incident.”54
Given this context, the declassified documents collectively offer a complex set 
of reasons for initially demurring to repeated U.S. requests for the deployment of 
additional U.K. forces to the Gulf. A list of London’s “cons” about EARNEST WILL 
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and deploying MCMVs to the Gulf probably would include the following argu-
ments, judging from the raw reporting.
EARNEST WILL Was a Flawed, Escalatory Operation
Talking points prepared for Thatcher on 15 July 1987 warned that the reflag 
decision carried risks of superpower competition and a counterproductive con-
frontation with Iran.55 The foreign secretary and defence minister jointly agreed 
on 27 July that it was U.S. action that had exacerbated the crisis by reflagging and 
convoying tankers. Supporting such an operation raised the risk of being drawn 
“further into involvement with U.S. policy, and into an operational crisis in the 
Gulf, which would in turn increase the risk to British vessels.”56 They subse-
quently wrote on 29 July that U.K. policy had been to avoid joint operations with 
the Americans in the Gulf because “of the likelihood that they would lead to our 
being included in a U.S. confrontation over which we had no control. Once initi-
ated, such a confrontation could last a very long time.” By joining in, the United 
Kingdom “might actually increase the risk to British shipping.”57
The two leaders concluded that Britain would have to turn down the U.S. re-
quest for MCMVs despite any strains that caused on the alliance. They acknowl-
edged that it would not be “an easy message to present to the Americans.”58 And 
yet, only thirteen days later, even after they had submitted a strongly worded 
memo against deploying MCMVs to the Gulf, the prime minister would over-
rule them.
America Might Lack the Commitment to Sustain Prolonged Operations  
against Iran
In talking points for briefing the prime minister in March 1987, the FCO warned 
that joining in the U.S. operation had potential downsides, including a potential 
replay of the Multinational Force in Lebanon experience following the October 
1983 Beirut Marine barracks bombing. “We should not encourage a U.S./Iran 
confrontation in Gulf from which U.S. might in due course need to withdraw, 
leaving Arab friends worse off than before.”59 Younger and Howe wrote in July 
1987 that “the Americans were unwise to rush into their policy of protecting Ku-
wait tankers without proper consideration how they could sustain their commit-
ment; their credibility is on the line.”60 Summarizing U.K. thinking on 30 July, the 
FCO advised its embassy in Washington as follows: “We remain doubtful about 
assuming commitments which cannot be sustained.”61 In recapping a meeting 
in October 1987 with Edward W. Gnehm Jr., the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Near East and South Asia, the FCO notified its posts that, although 
Secretary Weinberger’s trip to the Gulf had confirmed Gulf-state support for U.S. 
actions, the Arabs continued to doubt longer-term U.S. resolve.62
Perhaps aware of such doubts, when National Security Advisor Carlucci met 
with the prime minister on 3 August 1987 he attempted to reassure London of 
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Washington’s determination to execute EARNEST WILL and to protect U.S. inter-
ests. Speaking shortly after the Bridgeton mining, he opined that if there were 
further incidents directly traceable to Iran, Reagan would face considerable pres-
sure to retaliate. Carlucci judged that there was a risk that Iran could conclude er-
roneously that it could divide opinion in the United States. Given this perception, 
he averred that if there was any hostile action public opinion would rally behind 
the president; it would not be another Lebanon.63
Independence in Foreign Policy and Naval Operations Buttressed London’s  
Image as a Neutral
Throughout EARNEST WILL, the United Kingdom remained adamant that the 
Royal Navy would not conduct integrated operations under U.S. control, al-
though it allowed informal coordination among local naval commanders. When 
British officials met with Assistant Secretary of State Murphy on 5 June 1987, they 
“made it clear our non-provocative and independent policy continued and we 
had serious reservations about any more integrated operations.”64
The prime minister wrote in July 1987 that “there are formidable practical as 
well as political problems in the way of a multinational force. . . . [S]uch a force 
might in practice have a higher profile than the present arrangements.”65 She 
then directed the cabinet to prepare for discussions about bilateral coordination 
in the Gulf while making it clear that the RN presence would not include joint or 
integrated operations.66
Even when Defence Minister Younger called Defense Secretary Weinberger in 
mid-August 1987 to announce that London would deploy MCMVs to the Gulf, 
he reminded Weinberger that “Armilla’s role and AOR [area of responsibility] 
would remain unchanged.”67 Talking points prepared for the defence minister’s 
use noted that Armilla would not go into the northern Gulf because “the risks of 
integration with the United States were too high to contemplate.”68
When EARNEST WILL was well under way by March 1988, R. Rand “Randy” 
Beers, policy coordinator in State’s Political-Military Affairs Bureau, told of-
ficials in the MOD and FCO that the United States was considering extending 
protection for neutral shipping in the Gulf, an effort in which allies might be 
asked to provide more ships and integrate more closely with the U.S. Navy, or 
at least integrate more among themselves. The British responded that there was 
no likelihood the United Kingdom would alter its position on integration with 
the U.S. Navy. If the Royal Navy sent more ships to the Gulf, they would support 
U.K.-flagged/owned ships only.69
Publicizing RN Cooperation Would Undermine London’s Low-Profile Strategy
Consequently, Reagan’s request that Britain highlight its actions to promote 
Western interests and undertake more-visible operations with the United States 
in the Gulf was problematic, although talking points that the FCO prepared for a 
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meeting with Secretary of State Shultz concluded that “we can meet both of Rea-
gan’s requests presentationally without giving much of substance.”70 U.K. officials 
had written earlier that the U.S. public had “almost total ignorance” of U.K. opera-
tions in the Gulf and that more publicity might reduce congressional pressure for 
further burden sharing.71 However, the notes for the Shultz meeting continued, 
“Publicity for exercises would look like participation in a Gulf war and will need 
very careful handling.”72
EARNEST WILL Might Lead to Preemptive or Disproportionate  
U.S. Military Operations
Monitoring U.S. press and official activity, London’s staffers watched for signs of 
escalatory American military activity, such as a preemptive attack on the Silk-
worm ASCMs that had appeared in the Gulf in 1987.73 Minutes prepared for a 
briefing of the prime minister in March 1987 warned that “if naval discussions 
suggest U.S. seriously thinking of contriving to attack Silkworm sites we may 
need to express our doubts in Washington at high political level.”74 The foreign 
secretary then was willing to consider limited coordination of RN activity with 
the United States, on the strict condition that the agreed aim was to deter Iran 
and “not to contrive an excuse for, say, striking the Silkworm missiles.”75 Despite 
such willingness to cooperate, the FCO characterized the U.S. mood as being 
“aggressively anti-Iran” at the end of July 1987.76
British officials repeatedly approached their American counterparts to assess 
the risks of a preemptive U.S. attack on the Silkworms, a course of action that by 
June 1987 was not being considered seriously in Washington, according to their 
interlocutors.77 In preparing Prime Minister Thatcher for a visit to the United 
States in July, FCO officials raised the risk of a confrontation with Iran and wrote 
that they hoped the United States would be as “non-provocative as possible.”78 
When Thatcher met with Reagan on 17 July, she told him it was important not to 
escalate the conflict. Reagan agreed and said that the United States would attack 
only in self-defense against an Iranian attack.79
These agreements did not reassure the FCO after further Iranian provoca-
tions. Following Iran’s Silkworm attack on the reflagged Kuwaiti tanker Sea 
Isle City on 16 October 1987 and the U.S. retaliatory attack on two Iranian oil 
platforms in the Persian Gulf three days later, the FCO prepared talking points 
for use with the prime minister; they warned of a “continuing need to counsel 
restraint and proportionality in response to Americans—wise counsels may not 
always prevail.”80
In the subsequent cabinet meeting, the foreign secretary opined that the 
Gulf had become tenser than ever before. He commented that it might become 
increasingly difficult for the United States to respond to Iranian actions in ways 
that were both “constrained and effective.”81 Such doubts led Britain to seek early 
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notifications of U.S. contingency operations in the Gulf, a consideration repeat-
edly accorded to the United Kingdom.82
Such concerns, repeated British requests, and the Royal Navy’s presence in 
the Persian Gulf may have contributed to Washington’s willingness to share 
with London the broad outlines of U.S. military planning and to warn London 
and U.K. forces in the Gulf of impending military operations. U.S. officials 
assured their counterparts that the United States intended to provide such 
warning, and the British seemed satisfied that the system was working.83 For 
example, as the United States was planning Operation PRAYING MANTIS to re-
taliate for the mining of USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG 58) on 14 April 1988, the 
British embassy in Washington reported that “U.S. officials have assured us that 
we will be informed in advance of any operation, as on previous occasions.”84 
CNO Crowe telephoned Chief of the Defence Staff Fieldhouse shortly before 
the operation started.85 General Colin L. Powell, the national security advisor, 
the next day updated Thatcher’s personal secretary on U.S. thinking regarding 
next military steps.86
Minesweeping Was Neither Viable nor Currently Necessary
In late July 1987, Britain’s foreign and defence ministers wrote that currently there 
was no mine threat in the Armilla OPAREA, although they acknowledged that 
could change with little warning. Moreover, in a long staff study they made a case 
against minesweeping, arguing that MCMVs could not clear a large area, would 
be confined to daylight operations at speeds not greater than eight knots, and 
would slow down merchant ships significantly if they tried to sweep ahead of a 
convoy. Additionally, Iran could reseed minefields easily. Destroying Iran’s mine 
warfare infrastructure would expand the conflict greatly.87
London preferred to use diplomacy and GCC MCM assets over deploying 
U.K. MCMVs, although the U.K. strategy for turning down the U.S. request was 
to offer technical naval counterarguments, in what its officials acknowledged 
would be a “difficult” process of declining the U.S. requests.88 In answering Ad-
miral Crowe’s request for MCMVs, Foreign Secretary Howe in July 1987 recom-
mended that the chief of defence staff should “quote technical military arguments 
demonstrating that it was not militarily sensible to use minesweepers, that they 
were too far away to do the job properly, and that a large number would be re-
quired, etc.”89
The ministers argued in July 1987 against even repositioning minesweepers to 
staging areas closer to the Gulf, as Admiral Crowe had requested. They character-
ized the measure as a “temporizing response” that would “soon become public and 
create an expectation that we would join the U.S. operation.” Staging MCMVs also 
would have costs to the United Kingdom: “It would then be virtually impossible 
not to proceed without giving the impression that our nerve had failed.”90
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Diplomacy Should Not Be Undermined by Naval Incidents
Throughout EARNEST WILL, Washington and London focused foremost on end-
ing the Iran-Iraq War by reaching a truce that, through negotiations, might yield 
a lasting peace. They reasoned that a cessation in ship attacks might support the 
broader initiative.
Seeking to create diplomatic breathing room to allow time for a cease-fire in 
ship attacks to occur in July 1987, Prime Minister Thatcher told ministers draft-
ing a response to the U.S. request for MCMVs that the West should avoid raising 
the profile of its military forces in the Gulf while a moratorium on ship attacks 
held. Her private secretary told National Security Advisor Carlucci on 1 August 
that the U.K. government “took the view that it was better not to increase the 
profile of the Western military presence at this juncture while there was a chance 
of progress on the diplomatic front towards de-escalating tension in the Gulf.”91
THATCHER REVERSES HER MCMV DECISION
Prime Minister Thatcher was attuned to threat conditions in the Persian Gulf, 
maintenance of good relations with the United States on issues such as burden 
sharing, and the importance of apparent cohesion in the Western alliance to 
enhance its diplomatic credibility and regional deterrence. These factors influ-
enced her to reconsider in early August 1987 her refusal to provide MCMVs to 
the Gulf.
In part, she was struck by the rapidly deteriorating regional security situation 
in midsummer 1987. Thousands of Iranian pilgrims rioted in Mecca on 31 July 
1987, with hundreds of people being killed.92 Attacks against the Saudi, Kuwaiti, 
and French embassies in Tehran followed on 1 August and were accompanied by 
official Iranian calls for the overthrow of the Saudi government.93
By 4 August, the prime minister concluded that Britain’s posture on Persian 
Gulf strategy needed to be “looked at afresh,” and related taskers began to flow 
to the bureaucracy.94 Iran’s mining of Texaco Caribbean in the Gulf of Oman off 
Fujairah, United Arab Emirates, on 10 August 1987 provided the immediate 
catalyst for her decision the next day to send four MCMVs and a support ship 
to the Gulf.95
Meeting with Carlucci on 3 August 1987, Thatcher expressed concern about 
developments during the past few days and the prospect that Gulf tensions would 
continue to escalate in the form of maritime guerrilla warfare and possibly direct 
attacks on U.S. ships. The chance for diplomacy to reduce tensions had dimin-
ished. She concluded that the main requirement was action by every means at the 
UN and elsewhere to isolate Iran.96
Thatcher told the cabinet on 4 August 1987 that there had been a qualitative 
change in the situation in the Persian Gulf that mandated a new look at the United 
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Kingdom’s Gulf policy. She judged that it was unrealistic to think any longer in 
terms of a window of opportunity to de-escalate by diplomatic measures. Rather, 
Iran was intent on terrorist actions against the United States and GCC and might 
engage in further mining or other attacks. Britain’s main priorities must be to take 
further diplomatic steps to isolate Iran, maintain GCC morale, and demonstrate 
the West’s unity of purpose. The prime minister also was concerned that Britain’s 
well-publicized decision not to send MCMVs to the Gulf—or even to preposition 
them—had conveyed the wrong political signal. “Our failure to meet a request 
for help from our closest ally had given an appearance of division and disunity 
among the Western governments and had probably worried the Arab states of the 
gulf. We should not think just in terms of British ships but acknowledge a wider 
duty to help uphold freedom of navigation.”97
Her taskers to the cabinet had diplomatic and military dimensions. Diplomati-
cally, the United Kingdom was to press hard and visibly for a further UNSC reso-
lution imposing an arms embargo against Iran for not following UNSCR 598, and 
Britain also should promote a resolution condemning the mining in the Gulf and 
upholding freedom of navigation. London would urge Moscow to put all possible 
pressure on Tehran to desist from mining and garner Soviet support for the arms 
embargo against Iran envisioned in the follow-on resolution to UNSCR 598.98
On the military side, the government would consider prepositioning MCMVs 
to possible holding points, including Gibraltar, Cyprus, Port Said, Djibouti, and 
Muscat. In the event they deployed, London would seek the “fullest consultation” 
with Washington about strategy in the Gulf. Early consideration would be given 
to other assets the United Kingdom might send to the region. Britain would pre-
pare for further arms requests from the Arab countries in the region.99
By 7 August 1987, Thatcher continued to weigh in to soften the United King-
dom’s initial rejection by amending the British defence minister’s draft response 
to Secretary of Defense Weinberger’s 31 July request for forward deployment 
of MCMVs. She wanted to emphasize that Britain had “certainly not” ruled out 
eventually deploying its MCMVs to the Gulf. Her private secretary summarized 
her guidance for the revised letter as follows: “We are looking afresh at all our 
contingency arrangements, so that we would be able to move the minesweepers 
as quickly as possible. We are looking at the situation very closely, on a day to 
day basis, and looking to see how we can help from the U.S. viewpoint, as well 
as our own.”100
On 11 August, Thatcher decided to deploy immediately four Hunt-class 
MCMVs and a support ship from the United Kingdom to the Persian Gulf, where 
they arrived in mid-September.101 The order reflected a British assessment that 
there was a heightened risk to the Armilla patrol following the discovery of mines 
in the southern end of and outside the Gulf during the preceding twenty-four 
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hours.102 The FCO prepared an overview that characterized the mining in the 
Gulf of Oman as a “direct threat to British ships” that led London to “send mine-
sweepers in support of British national interests.”103
Additionally, two maritime patrol aircraft were to deploy to Maşīrah, Oman, 
by 14 August as a public demonstration of commitment.104 London would send 
diplomatic notes requesting port access and logistics for the naval deployers to 
the Gulf.105 The United Kingdom also prepared to encourage Western European 
Union (WEU) participation by sending messages to the governments of France, 
Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands notifying them of the MCMV deployment, 
and adding that these countries would be assumed to be considering following 
suit.106
BILATERAL COOPERATION FROM SEPTEMBER 1987 TO JULY 1988
The United Kingdom cooperated with the United States during EARNEST WILL 
by providing support in the UN and elsewhere; serving as a gateway to WEU 
countries—notably, Belgium and the Netherlands—for mine countermeasures 
initiatives, particularly in the Armilla OPAREA in the southern Gulf and Strait of 
Hormuz; recovering mines and continuing the patrol’s hectic mission of accom-
panying merchant ships; and pursuing diplomacy that helped the United States, 
particularly after Operation PRAYING MANTIS in April 1988 and in the aftermath 
of the Iran Air 655 Airbus shootdown in July 1988.
Although the United States did not then achieve the formal joint naval com-
mand structure it had proposed, by October 1987 Washington was “content with 
the pragmatic coordination of minesweeping,” according to U.K. diplomatic 
reporting.107 British MCMVs contributed directly by clearing five mines off Fujai-
rah and four off Qatar by the end of November 1987, according to John Roberts’s 
history of the Royal Navy.108
The British also encouraged the Dutch and Belgian navies, with whom the 
Royal Navy had operated in a NATO context, to participate in the Gulf MCM 
effort. The Dutch in September 1987 committed two minehunters, while the Bel-
gians sent two minesweepers and a support ship, which arrived in the Gulf by late 
fall.109 As of November 1987, the Royal Navy was liaising closely with both navies 
in the Gulf, but their operations were not yet integrated.110 The three navies im-
proved cooperation by February 1988 as the United Kingdom prepared to return 
one of its four MCMVs to home waters.111 The FCO reported by April 1988 that 
“cooperation with the Dutch and Belgians (under a WEU umbrella) has worked 
well.” London also warned Washington that further U.S. pressure on its two allies 
to keep ships in the Gulf might be counterproductive.112
The Royal Navy saw the opportunity to showcase the MCM capabilities of the 
three navies in the southern Persian Gulf following the Roberts mine strike on 14 
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April 1988. The U.K. MOD directed its senior naval officer in the Gulf to encour-
age the other two navies to join British ships in clearing the minefield near the 
Roberts strike, as a good opportunity to demonstrate the usefulness of trilateral 
cooperation. However, the MOD urged that the Royal Navy be seen as taking the 
initiative. In its guidance to RN senior commanders, the ministry added that it 
wished to “avoid the suggestion that we are responding to a U.S. request or that 
we are/will be under U.S. control or guidance.”113 In discussing the ongoing trilat-
eral MCM operations on 21 April, cabinet talking points commented that the for-
tunate timing of the Roberts incident might persuade the Dutch and Belgians that 
their presence in the Persian Gulf was “useful and should not be terminated.”114 
By June 1988, the three countries had established a joint command consisting of 
a flagship, supply ship, and five minehunters under U.K. control.115
In the aftermath of PRAYING MANTIS, Washington wanted to pursue further 
initiatives in the UN and to improve coordination of naval operations in the 
theater. Even as Secretary of State Shultz notified the United Kingdom of the op-
eration on 18 April, he said that Iran’s actions “underscore the urgency of strong 
international measures in the UN to pass a followon resolution to UNSCR 598.”116 
On 22 April, Reagan wrote to Thatcher proposing a new, intensive diplomatic 
effort in the UN to end the conflict, improve coordination among Western naval 
forces in the Gulf, and enhance surveillance there to prevent mining, according 
to U.K. diplomatic reporting. The FCO advised its posts that Defence Minister 
Younger’s discussions with now–Secretary of Defense Carlucci on 27 April 1988 
had reached no firm conclusions, but at least the principals had agreed to explore 
greater coordination of MCM activity. Local commanders in the Gulf were to 
meet aboard USS Trenton (LPD 14) on 1 May to discuss the matter.117
However, the cabinet remained wary of expanding the Royal Navy’s role and 
advised a cautious response to Reagan’s letter. Concerned about the earlier U.S. 
proposal for a review of the coordination of forces in the Gulf, the foreign secre-
tary said in a late April 1988 cabinet meeting that the United Kingdom must be 
careful not to allow “responsibilities to run ahead of the resources available.”118
The president’s letter also may have been prompted by the U.S. decision by 29 
April 1988 to provide distress assistance to additional neutral merchant ships in 
the Persian Gulf.119 The Cabinet Office assessment on 3 May offered a range of 
complaints about the policy, noting that London long had urged Washington to 
be cautious about extending the rules of engagement. The new policy was an-
nounced without proper consultation with the United Kingdom. It could lead to 
pressure on Britain and other European nations to follow suit. The Royal Navy 
lacked adequate resources to support it, and the initiative might interfere with 
enhanced U.K. minesweeping coordination. Most seriously, a systematic policy 
of distress assistance was likely to lower the threshold for U.S.-Iranian clashes and 
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increase risks of Iranian attacks on shipping and offshore installations because 
of a narrowing of military options. Although the FCO wrote that it “must give 
general support [to] U.S. policy,” it began revising its response to Reagan’s letter, 
concentrating its warnings particularly on the dubious European reaction, the 
policy’s risk of lowering the threshold of conflict, and London’s concern that it 
had not been consulted adequately on this initiative.120
Despite its misgivings, in a memo dated 24 May 1988 London determined that 
British shippers would be permitted to accept distress assistance on the condi-
tion that the master of the ship requested help in each case.121 Given its residual 
concern about perceived U.S. escalatory tendencies, the cabinet noted that the 
United Kingdom had accepted the offer, but hinted clearly that London saw dis-
tress assistance primarily as a humanitarian initiative and held that its use should 
not contravene the use of minimum force only. The note continued by observing 
that several European partners harbored doubts about U.S. intentions in offering 
distress assistance, which they considered provocative to Iran. Ultimately, in June 
1988, the MOD provided British shippers with guidance on when to avail them-
selves of distress assistance, principally reminding them that such use should be 
confined to situations in which their ships were distant from the Armilla patrol.122
The United Kingdom’s public messaging and private diplomacy also endorsed 
U.S. operations during PRAYING MANTIS. U.K. officials proved to be unsym-
pathetic audiences when Iranian diplomats approached them to protest appar-
ent British endorsement of the operation in April 1988. For example, the FCO 
reported that on 25 April 1988 M. Akhondzadeh Basti, the Iranian chargé in 
London, told U.K. diplomats that the attacks had undermined Iranian attempts 
to reduce tension. His British interlocutor countered that it was instead Iranian 
provocations that had raised tensions, and that the United Kingdom applauded 
the U.S. action. He continued that Iran should expect a strong reaction to laying 
mines in international waters and dismissed as ridiculous Basti’s claim that the 
Americans themselves had laid mines recently. Referring to the chargé’s warning 
that U.K. support would threaten the Western world’s economy, he expressed the 
hope that this was not a threat.123
London also took diplomatic measures to blunt a potential Iranian-sponsored 
UN resolution against U.S. (and potentially all foreign) naval presence in the Gulf 
after USS Vincennes (CG 49) shot down an Iranian Airbus on 3 July 1988. That 
day, London issued a public statement—which Thatcher and Howe repeated—
regretting the incident but noting that it “underlines the urgent need for early 
end to the Iran/Iraq conflict including an end to all attacks on shipping.” Cabinet 
discussions on 7 July 1988 revealed that Iran had requested a full meeting of the 
Security Council and was canvassing its members regarding a draft resolution 
condemning the United States and demanding withdrawal of foreign forces from 
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the Persian Gulf. Public comment by British officials had stressed the right of 
self-defense for U.S. naval forces in the Persian Gulf under article 51 of the UN 
Charter, a policy the FCO urged that Britain continue, given the Armilla patrol’s 
activities in the Gulf.124
Although the United Kingdom had its own reasons for supporting a naval 
presence in the Gulf, its postshootdown diplomacy might have been reinforced 
by a note from President Reagan to Thatcher on 11 July 1988. The missive argued 
that the UN should not be used as a forum “to undermine our mutual interests 
in the Gulf and the Western naval presence there, or as a means to undermine 
UNSCR 598 as the basic framework for a settlement.” While inviting Thatcher’s 
advice and support, he shared a diplomatic strategy in which the United States 
would oppose a resolution that would distract from UNSCR 598. Rather, the 
president judged that Security Council unanimity might be preserved better by a 
statement from the Security Council president that regretted the accident; called 
for an investigation; and, most importantly, urged the earliest implementation of 
resolution 598.125
Preparing for the Security Council’s meeting on 14 July 1988 to discuss the 
shootdown, the FCO advised its posts that “we are not prepared to let Iran use 
the Council selectively. It has flouted the authority of the UN over UNSCR 598 
and cannot now expect the Council to address the Airbus incident in isolation.” 
London intended to keep UNSCR 598 at the discussion’s center and to refer to 
the principles of freedom of navigation and self-defense.126 Following the debate, 
the UN on 20 July 1988 passed UNSCR 616, which expressed “deep distress” over 
the U.S. attack and “profound regret” for the loss of human lives, but also stressed 
the need to end the war.127
THE CHALLENGES OF COOPERATION
The United States was fortunate to have such a good partner as the United 
Kingdom during the prolonged and risky tanker-escort regime. Although other 
countries reluctantly deployed ships to the region, none were so supportive—or 
so critical to achieving our shared diplomatic objectives for ending the Iran-Iraq 
War—as our partners in the United Kingdom. The Royal Navy worked closely 
with its U.S. counterpart despite national-level reservations and under trying cir-
cumstances that foreshadowed those encountered in the more complex coalition 
operations that followed.
A few observations about Anglo-American cooperation during EARNEST 
WILL are discussed below.
• The U.S. diplomatic record in the 1980s was not persuasive to all U.K. of-
ficials, who raised doubts about it in internal memorandums and even in 
discussions with the United States. Washington’s allies in Europe and the 
20
Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 2, Art. 9
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss2/9
 1 5 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Gulf were sensitive to issues of U.S. reliability following American arms sales 
to Iran as part of Iran-Contra and the country’s withdrawal of forces from 
Lebanon in 1984 after committing them to the Multinational Force there, 
alongside the United Kingdom, France, and Italy. The model that Ameri-
can policy makers offered—international cooperation to clear mines laid 
in the Red Sea in mid-1984—was unconvincing to the British officials, who 
pointed out that the 1984 effort was a poor analogy because countries in the 
Persian Gulf either distrusted Western presence and commitment or were 
active enemies, unlike those along the Red Sea.128
• Under domestic pressure to create an international coalition for EARNEST 
WILL, U.S. officials at times appeared to be tone-deaf and insensitive to the 
dynamics of London’s decision-making calculus. Washington’s demands 
probably hardened London’s attitude and its responses to the United States; 
its naval strategy in the Gulf did not change, for example, until the cabinet 
concluded that the threat to U.K. interests—notably, the safety of the Armilla 
patrol and U.K. shipping—had increased rapidly.129 Repeatedly pressing an 
ally on the same issue is not necessarily effective, no matter how good the 
working relationship.
• The United States might have used a more persuasive, low-key approach in 
asking for the minesweeper deployments. When Carlucci met with the cabi-
net secretary on 3 August 1987, the national security advisor asked whether 
it would have been advantageous for the United States to take “informal 
soundings” of the British government before requesting the MCMV deploy-
ment to the Gulf. Sir Robert Armstrong responded that such informal com-
munications certainly would have been helpful, if time permitted.130
• In meeting with other British officials the same day, Carlucci told them 
that he thought the U.S. request for minesweepers—of which he and 
Reagan had been unaware—had not been handled very skillfully. Car-
lucci asked the prime minister whether a request for British naval support 
from the GCC rather than the United States would have been preferable. 
Thatcher replied that there were advantages in an appeal from the GCC 
for international cooperation to preserve freedom of navigation, but she 
doubted the GCC countries collectively would request minesweeping. An-
other possibility would have been to call for international action to remove 
mines, but she opined that that step would have been an invitation to the 
Russians to get involved.131
• A low-key discussion about potential U.K. minesweeper deployments 
earlier and at a much higher level might have been more effective. Instead, 
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President Reagan started with a relatively undemanding request for ad-
ditional bilateral exercises and more publicity about the U.K. naval com-
mitment to the region, but then as regional tensions rose subordinates 
requested more. As leaks occurred, both the U.S. request for MCMVs and 
the U.K. rebuff received press coverage—to the detriment of both parties.
• British officials were aware of U.S. domestic politics and privy to internal 
U.S. debates on EARNEST WILL.132 The sophistication of British policy mak-
ers probably contributed to their skepticism about some U.S. argumenta-
tion, since the United Kingdom apparently perceived American domestic 
politics to be as much a driver of U.S. behavior as an increasingly threaten-
ing Iran.
• Both Washington and London encouraged cooperation among local com-
manders in the Gulf. This allowed de facto coordination, even though at the 
time the United States never achieved its original objective of establishing a 
formal multinational naval command under its control. In other words, there 
were theater-level work-arounds within national constraints.
• Focused as Washington was on the maritime domain of war in a relatively 
small arena against a weak adversary, it probably would have found facili-
tating international cooperation during EARNEST WILL to be a relatively 
simple effort compared with planning for an intense, multidomain conflict 
against a more robust enemy in the future—conditions that would be found 
in many scenarios envisioned, and later encountered, by the United States 
and its allies. 
Britain’s collaboration with the United States demonstrated the benefits of having 
sophisticated, capable partners, but it also reveals the challenges of working in 
coalitions, even under the best conditions. To get the most out of such alliances, 
U.S. policy makers need to develop as sophisticated an understanding of their 
allies as they try to develop of their adversaries.
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